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The impacts of climate change on human systems depend not only on the level of emissions but also on 
how inherently vulnerable these systems are to the changing climate. There are large uncertainties on the 
future degrees of development and structure of societies and economies and hence the assessment of 
climate change effects is complex. One way to deal with this complexity is by using scenario analysis that 
takes account of these socio-economic differences. The challenge of developing scenarios is to identify the 
dimensions along which societies and economies evolve over time in such a way that covers sufficiently 
different vulnerability patterns. This conceptual effort is critical for the development of informative 
scenarios. Here, we identify three dimensions on which to build a new set of scenarios to assess climate 
change effects on human systems. The dimensions we propose take into account the most relevant factors 
that define the vulnerability of human systems to climate change and their ability to adapt to it. 
Introduction  
Since its first report in 1990, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) has aimed to provide information on 
climate change risks and policy options, to 
inform decision- and policy-makers. Of 
particular importance is the assessment of 
possible climate change impacts, adaptation 
options, and vulnerabilities (IAV). The 1992 
United Nations Convention on Climate 
Change commits to avoiding ‘dangerous’ 
climate change, and as such an IAV 
assessment is a critical component in 
determining policy targets for emissions 
reduction1. Information related to impacts are 
also relevant for designing anticipatory 
climate change adaptation strategies, and in 
assessing the financial resources that will be 
necessary to implement them.  
One difficulty in IAV assessment, however, is 
the fact that future climate change impacts – 
and the desirability of potential adaptation 
options – depend on many uncertain factors. 
Some of these factors are environmental, such 
as the response of the climate system to 
additional forcing from greenhouse gases 
(GHG), or the ability of ecosystems to cope 
with increasing temperatures and modified 
climate patterns. Climate change impacts and 
adaptation options will, however, also depend 
on many socio-economic determinants. The 
amount of GHG that will be emitted in the 
future and the ability of affected societies to 
cope with and adapt to climate change are 
especially important. These socio-economic 
determinants of climate change impacts and 
adaptation options will be driven by future 
demographic, economic, technological, social, 
and cultural changes. Any assessment of 
climate change impacts and adaptation options 
thus needs to make assumptions about these 
drivers and their future pathways. To 
investigate future climate change, a scenario 
of the pathways of these drivers throughout 
this century is therefore necessary.  
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Considering the wide uncertainties affecting 
these drivers, using one such scenario only is 
inappropriate. Climate change vulnerabilities 
would be underestimated if investigated only 
using optimistic assumptions, assuming for 
instance that extreme poverty disappears 
rapidly in the next decades. Such an 
underestimation would then lead to 
inappropriate policy advice on adaptation and 
mitigation policies. Using only pessimistic 
scenarios would similarly create a bias in 
estimates and proposed policies. To make 
robust decisions, i.e. those that yield 
acceptable outcomes for a broad range of 
plausible futures2, it is thus necessary to use a 
set of scenarios that spans the range of 
possible futures. 
Such sets of scenarios have already been 
developed to investigate climate change and 
other large-scale environmental and energy 
issues; see, for example, the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment3 or World Energy 
Outlook4. For climate change, the Special 
Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES)5 was 
produced by the IPCC to provide baseline 
scenarios for its Third Assessment Report. 
These scenarios represent “possible and 
consistent” futures for the world, up to 2100. 
They assume – counterfactually – that there 
are no climate change or climate policies, 
which is why they are referred to as 
“baselines.” 
The SRES scenarios were built by a working 
group including academic scientists, 
environmental organizations, industrial 
scientists, engineers, economists and systems 
analysts. From different possible pathways of 
the main drivers of society’s evolution, 
including for example population trends, 
technological change, and economic growth, 
etc., they created “storylines” or “narratives”, 
i.e. qualitative descriptions of plausible future 
world evolutions from which quantitative 
modelling exercises could then be derived. 
Depending on the retained assumptions and on 
the numerical model that was used, the 
narratives lead to scenarios with different 
levels of GHG emissions, resulting in different 
amplitudes and patterns of climate change. 
They also lead to scenarios with different 
socio-economic pathways, which can be 
translated into different climate change 
vulnerabilities.  
As explained in Moss and colleagues6, 
however, the SRES scenarios will be replaced, 
and new frameworks to develop a new set of 
scenarios have been suggested7,8. Like SRES 
scenarios, these scenarios will lead to different 
vulnerabilities and to different GHG 
emissions. However, in the new approach, 
climate and socio-economic scenarios are built 
in parallel, starting from scenarios of future 
radiative forcings, known as Representative 
Concentration Pathways, or RCPs. Climate 
modellers assess the climate response to these 
forcings, while other modellers build socio-
economic scenarios consistent with these 
RCPs. Unlike SRES scenarios, some of these 
new socio-economic scenarios will thus have 
to include mitigation policies.7,8 
New scenarios are needed to take into account 
new data and knowledge on technologies and 
preferences, and recent economic and 
demographic evolutions. But most 
importantly, the SRES scenarios were mainly 
developed to support mitigation policy 
analysis, and they have revealed difficult to 
use by the IAV community. To help the 
scientific community provide a consistent 
vision on climate risks and policies, the new 
scenarios will have to be appropriate both for 
mitigation and IAV analysis.  
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Here, we aim to contribute to the production 
of these new scenarios by investigating the 
specific needs of the IAV community. To do 
so, we first explain how socio-economic 
scenarios can be used for IAV analysis, and 
we highlight the limits and strengths of this 
approach. Then, we review the major 
vulnerabilities to climate change, and 
investigate their main socio-economic 
determinants. Finally, we propose to build a 
few narratives that cover a broad range of 
possible evolutions for these determinants, 
organized along three main dimensions: 
“homogenous” vs. “heterogeneous”; “poverty 
and development” vs. “inclusive 
development”; and “environment-oriented” vs. 
“environmentally-stressed.” 
Scenarios for IAV analysis 
Assessing impacts and adaptation options can 
be done using counterfactual “IAV-baseline” 
scenarios, i.e. scenarios that assume no climate 
change (and thus no impacts). A comparison 
between an IAV-baseline and a scenario 
including climate change and its impacts 
informs on the costs and benefits of adaptation 
actions, and on residual climate change 
impacts. Unlike SRES scenarios that have 
been designed mainly to serve as baselines to 
assess mitigation policies, IAV-baseline 
scenarios will be used to assess impacts and 
adaptation policies and may include emission 
reduction policies.  
IAV analyses based on this scenario approach 
frequently focus on a region or a subsystem 
(e.g., an ecosystem, an economic sector), and 
assume that the rest of the world is left 
unaffected by climate change and follows the 
evolution described in the baseline scenario. 
As a consequence, they often do not take into 
account the interactions of climate change 
impacts among regions, such as through 
commodity trade, or subsystems such as when 
water, energy, and agriculture interact. 
Moreover, this approach may create 
inconsistencies as it fails to include how the 
impacts of climate change modify GHG 
emissions.  
The scenario approach may also be 
questionable in cases of impacts that are so 
large that the scenario including climate 
change differs substantially from the baseline 
scenario. In that case, the vulnerability 
determinants (e.g., the number of people with 
no access to drinking water and sanitation) 
may be significantly different in the IAV-
baseline and in the climate-change scenarios, 
and baseline vulnerabilities cannot be used to 
assess climate change impacts. Nevertheless, 
this methodology makes possible the 
investigation of individual regions and 
subsystems independently from each other, a 
crucial advantage in IAV analysis. 
There is another approach used to investigate 
IAV issues, based on global-scale Integrated 
Assessment Models (IAMs) such as IMAGE9, 
MiniCAM10,11, MERGE12, AIM13, among 
others14. These models do not share the same 
limits as scenario-based approaches. In 
particular, they are able to provide insights on 
interactions among impacts and to explore 
possible systemic changes due to climate. 
They can also include the feedback from 
impacts to emissions. But IAMs cannot 
replace detailed local and subsystem IAV 
analyses, which are too complex for global-
scale analysis. As a consequence, scenario-
based IAV analyses are likely to remain the 
standard for the IPCC Fifth Assessment 
Report.  
Challenges in scenario building 
The impacts of climate change will depend on 
the sensitivity of affected societies and 
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economies to changes in climate conditions, 
and on their ability to adapt to it. The IAV-
baseline scenarios thus need to cover the most 
influential determinants of climate change 
vulnerability. These determinants can be 
identified from the IPCC review of the “key 
vulnerabilities” to climate change15 and from 
the more recent literature that followed. These 
vulnerabilities can be summarized in four 
(overlapping) categories.  
The first category encompasses climate 
impacts on agriculture and food security, 
especially in countries that depend on 
agricultural production and export for their 
livelihood and economic sustainability. This 
topic has been covered in the literature in 
relation to agriculture16, fisheries17, and food 
security and livelihood18. The second category 
includes the health19-21 and economic impacts 
on poor urban and rural communities that lack 
access to basic services, face multiple 
stressors22,23 and food security issues24 and 
have low adaptive capacity, e.g. low-
productivity food-producing farmers and slum 
dwellers. The third category of vulnerabilities 
comprises impacts through extreme events25-30 
like heat waves, floods and storms, especially 
but not uniquely in urban areas. The fourth 
and final category consists of impacts through 
increased natural resource scarcity (e.g., water 
scarcity and soil degradation), biodiversity 
losses, and reduction in ecosystem services.31 
The welfare impact of these physical 
vulnerabilities will depend on the adaptive 
capacity of affected populations, i.e. the ability 
to moderate potential damages, to take 
advantage of opportunities, or to cope with the 
consequences of global warming23,32-34. This 
adaptive capacity depends on financial and 
technical capacity, access to global financial 
capital, education and health, institutional 
capacity and governance, political weight in 
national and international policy debates, and 
the support received from other regions or 
countries (including foreign development aid 
and more specialized adaptation support).  
These categories do not include all factors 
influencing climate change impacts, especially 
considering the high level of uncertainty in 
this domain. Based on current knowledge, 
however, these categories appear to include 
the largest vulnerabilities, and we argue that 
IAV-baseline scenarios ought to cover their 
drivers and the uncertainties that surround 
them. 
Proposed dimensions of the narratives 
One way of constructing narratives for IAV-
baselines could be to create a very large 
number of scenarios that cover all identified 
uncertainties, and to assess climate change 
impacts and adaptation options in each of the 
scenarios. Then, it would be possible to select 
the few scenarios that are especially relevant 
for any particular decision that needs to be 
made: the most relevant scenarios may not be 
the same for analysing climate impacts and 
adaptation options in the agriculture sector or 
in the energy sector. This approach – labelled 
“scenario discovery” by Groves and 
Lempert35– is however difficult to apply to 
IAV analyses, considering the difficulty and 
resources involved in any impact or adaptation 
study. It appears unrealistic to investigate all 
climate impacts and adaptation options in 
more than a few scenarios.   
As an alternative, we propose to follow the 
classical approach used for the SRES 
scenarios, and to build a small set of 
qualitative narratives organized along a few 
dimensions that summarize what we expect to 
be the main determinant of the key 
vulnerabilities to climate change. Importantly, 
these dimensions are not the driving forces 
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behind the changes, but the results of a 
combination of driving forces (e.g., 
demographic changes, technological change). 
To cover as extensively as possible the 
potential futures of these determinants, and 
thus the possible futures of climate change 
vulnerabilities, we propose to build the 
narratives from a combination of three 
choices, one for each of the three following 
dimensions. 
The first of our proposed dimensions 
considers the possibility of a “homogeneous” 
world vs. a “heterogeneous” world. In a 
more homogeneous world, the economic and 
spatial structure of developing countries 
converges rapidly toward the economic and 
spatial structure of industrialized countries. 
For instance, the share of agriculture in 
developing-world economies decreases in 
terms of GDP and exports. Also, urbanization 
rates converge around developed-country 
standards; and available technologies are 
similar in industrialized and developing 
countries. Conversely, in a more 
heterogeneous world,  developing-country 
economies remain for an extended period of 
time based on agriculture, raw-material 
extraction, and tourism. These countries 
remain largely rural. In such a world, 
developing countries are more dependent on 
rich countries for high-technology goods and 
can balance their imports only thanks to low-
value-added goods and services. In contrast 
with the globalization dimension used in 
SRES scenarios, this dimension is not mainly 
about trade and openness, even though a more 
homogenous world has more international 
trade than more heterogeneous ones. This 
dimension is important for IAV analysis for 
two main reasons. First, depending on how 
developing countries and their economic 
structure evolve, the nature of their 
vulnerabilities will be different. Economies 
that remain rural and rely heavily on 
agriculture will have different vulnerabilities 
than countries that become urban and shift 
toward industries and services. Agriculture in 
developing countries is likely one of the 
sectors most negatively affected by climate 
change16. In a more homogenous world, these 
countries would be less vulnerable because 
agriculture becomes less important in their 
economy. They would also be at reduced risks 
of food insecurity because of better access to 
world food markets thanks to alternative non-
agricultural exports36. However, their urban 
population may be more vulnerable to natural 
disasters such as floods, and to network 
disruptions affecting electricity distribution or 
transport networks.  
Our second proposed dimension distinguishes 
between an “inclusive development” in 
which extreme poverty disappears rapidly 
vs. a “growth and poverty” development 
with a significant share of people remaining 
below the poverty line. This dimension 
represents inequalities within countries and 
regions. In a more inclusive world, the poorest 
communities have a voice in political choices, 
governance takes into account poverty 
reduction as an important policy goal, and the 
share of people in extreme poverty is rapidly 
reduced. Almost everybody gets access to 
basic services, such as health services, 
education, energy and transport, drinking 
water and sanitation, financial services, 
secured land tenure and decent housing, risk 
management practices (e.g., buying insurance 
or building dams). In a more “poverty and 
development” oriented world, a fraction of 
poor-country population is excluded from 
these services (e.g., urban poor in informal 
settlements). Development is uneven within 
countries, with some regions lagging behind 
average development (e.g., inland vs. coastal 
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areas), creating large pockets of extreme 
poverty. This dimension is partly independent 
of the previous one, because extreme poverty 
may either disappear or increase, regardless of 
economic structure and aggregate economic 
growth. This dimension can also include 
differences in terms of governance efficiency, 
e.g. in the ability to efficiently deal with 
conflicts over resources. It is important for 
IAV analysis to take into account this 
dimension because poor communities are 
considered the most vulnerable to climate 
change37. They are more exposed to 
environmental conditions and rely more 
heavily on unmediated environmental 
resources (e.g., their access to water is not 
mediated by infrastructure). They also have to 
cope with multiple stressors23 and have less 
capacity to adapt, because of lower financial 
capacity, education and health, institutional 
capacity, or political weight32.  
The last dimension in our proposal opposes an 
“environment-oriented” world vs. an 
“environmentally-stressed” world. In an 
environment-oriented world, policies, 
technologies and lifestyles lead to an efficient 
use of natural resources and reduce 
environmental stresses. In an environmentally-
stressed world, water-use is inefficient, energy 
and mobility demands are growing. Soil 
depletion and degradation are accelerated and 
reduce agriculture productivity and increase 
natural risks (e.g., floods). Biodiversity losses 
are large and ecosystem services are 
threatened. In this world, the unsustainable use 
of natural resources is creating environmental 
stresses, so that climate change affects already 
vulnerable environments. This dimension is 
largely independent of the previous ones, since 
economic development and poverty reduction 
may be done – temporarily – with or without 
efficient use of natural resources. This 
dimension is also independent from the 
implementation of climate policies. Indeed, 
many environmental problems improve 
spontaneously as country development 
exceeds a certain level (e.g., city air pollution), 
while GHG emissions may keep increasing 
with development, at least in some countries 
(the literature on the Environmental Kuznets 
Curve explores these issues38). It matters for 
IAV analysis because ecosystems ability to 
cope with climate change depends on the other 
stresses they have to cope with39, and because 
additional resource scarcity from climate 
change can have different consequences 
depending on how they are managed. For 
instance, reduced rainfall has larger economic 
consequences if existing resources are already 
stretched by inappropriate agriculture 
production and if ground water is not usable 
because of pollution or salinization40. 
Many other factors will be important in world 
evolutions and will influence vulnerability. 
For instance, other factors such as the 
consequences of the 2008 financial crisis may 
be more important for near-term vulnerability, 
e.g., up to 2030. Also, since climate change 
impacts and adaptation options are very 
context-specific and require local studies, 
global scenarios will need to be downscaled 
into local scenarios41. At a local scale, some 
factors that are secondary at the global scale 
may become dominant. But at the global scale 
and over the long term, i.e. up to 2100, the 
three dimensions we propose in this paper 
appear to us as the main drivers of climate 
change vulnerability.  
One way forward  
To build narratives, two possibilities can be 
selected for each dimension, leading to eight 
narratives – and eight IAV-baseline scenarios 
– that can be located along our three axes 
(homogeneous vs. heterogeneous; inclusive 
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vs. poverty and development; environment-
oriented vs. environmentally-stressed; Fig 1). 
These dimensions provide thus a mapping of 
future possible worlds. In addition to these 
dimensions, it has been proposed that IAV-
baseline scenarios may include mitigation 
policies, such that GHG emissions follow one 
of the RCPs7,8. Comparing climate change 
impacts and adaptation options with different 
mitigation policies (leading to different RCPs) 
in the same narratives would inform on the 
benefits from mitigation.  
Figure 1: Narrative representation with three dimensions. 
The possibilities for each dimension need to 
be contrasted enough to lead to narratives that 
are sufficiently distinct in their vulnerability 
patterns. The quantification of these narratives 
remains to be done, and additional work is 
needed to build scenarios. In particular, it will 
be necessary to decide how contrasted the 
narratives should be (e.g., what is the 
difference in urbanization rate between the 
homogenous and heterogeneous worlds?), and 
to build them in a way that ensures their 
internal consistency. Such quantification may 
show that the eight narratives are not equally 
realistic and consistent. A careful quantified 
analysis may even lead us to discard some of 
the combinations of drivers displayed in 
Figure 1. But before the scientific community 
starts to run models and invest in scenario 
building, a debate on the most appropriate 
dimensions of the analysis needs to be held. 
We hope this proposal can help to initiate and 
contribute to this important debate. 
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